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ARGUMENT 
The State appears to be confused as to who the defendant is in this case. This case 
involves whether Defendant Jamis Johnson made fraudulent statements in connection with 
the offer or sale of a security. Yet, the State's brief demonstrates little evidence exists 
regarding statements of any kind made by Johnson during the transaction at issue. Instead, 
the State's brief focuses on Paul A. Schwenke. The State, for example, acknowledges that 
Schwenke was the one who did most of the talking, who came up with the idea for 
American Dairy.com Corp. ("American Dairy"), and who described the plan to both 
Johnson and the alleged victims, Ronald Myers ("Myers") and James Young ('Toung"). (See 
Appellee's Br., pp. 5-6.) Schwenke introduced Johnson to Myers and Young, and 
purportedly described Johnson as a "stock expert" and a "high powered lawyer." (See id.) 
In contrast to Schwenke, by all accounts Johnson's involvement was very limited. 
The State has never identified a single "untrue statement of material fact" made by Johnson 
during the events at issue. In fact, both Young and Myers testified that Johnson made no 
statements that turned out not to be true. (R. 1999:153,191, 232.) 
Undaunted by the lack of evidence of actual statements by Johnson meeting the 
statutory requirements, the State zealously prosecuted Johnson for what he allegedly failed to 
say. The State argues that Johnson violated Section 61-1-1(2) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act (the "Act") by making an omission of material fact in connection with the 
offer or sale of a security. However, the State's "omission" case against Johnson is based 
upon a fundamental misinterpretation of Utah's Act Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 make it 
unlawful for "any person" in connection with the "offer" or "sale" of a security to 
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"willfully" omit to state a material fact necessary to make a statement actually made by that 
person not misleading, in light of the circumstances in which the statement is made. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21 (2000). The State has not identified any statements by 
Johnson that were rendered misleading by an omission. 
Nevertheless, the State mistakenly asserts that because Johnson is a so-called "control 
person" of American Dairy, he has enhanced disclosure obligations and, as a result, greater 
criminal liability than other persons under Section 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. Stated otherwise, 
the State insists that a "president" of a corporation can be convicted of violating Sections 
61-1-1 and 61-1-21 even though the president says nothing at all because such control 
persons have a "broad" yet vaguely defined "list" of information, such as "historical business 
information," they must always affirmatively disclose. {See Appellee's Br. pp. 7-8.) 
This "pure omission" interpretation is simply not supported by the language of the 
Act and, as such, undermines the State's entire case against Johnson. There is no "control 
person" criminal liability under the Act through enhanced affirmative disclosure obligations 
or otherwise. Notably, Johnson was not charged with conspiracy (with Schwenke or 
American Dairy) to violate Section 61-1-1 nor with some form of secondary or vicarious 
liability as a control person of American Dairy. Johnson was charged as an individual'with 
violating Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21. (R. 63-65.) Moreover, the Act is not even applicable 
to Johnson in this case because he did not offer or sell securities to Myers and Young for 
value. Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the State to present its incorrect interpretation 
to the jury, both through the prosecutor's statements and the testimony of its expert witness, 
the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities, Michael Hines. 
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I. T H E SECURITIES ACT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AFFIRMATIVE 
DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS OR OTHER SUCH ENHANCED 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CONTROL PERSONS, 
A. Section 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 makes each "person" criminally liable only for 
his own material misstatements or omissions and does not require 
affirmative disclosures of any "person," 
Section 61-1-1(2) makes it "unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, 
sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . . . to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (emphasis added). Utah 
Code Section 61-1-21(2) provides criminal liability and penalties for any "person" who 
"willfully" violates Section 61-1-1. Id § 61-1-21 (2)(a). 
Utah Code Section 61-1-13 defines "person" as: 
an individual, a corporation, a partnership, a limited liability company, an 
association, a joint-stock company, a joint venture, a trust where the interests 
of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security, an unincorporated 
organization, a government, or a political subdivision of government. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(19)(2000) (emphasis added). By using the disjunctive "or" in this 
definition, the legislature defined an "individual" to be distinct from a "corporation" or 
other business entity. It did not, for example, define "person" to include a "corporation and 
its president, officers, directors, principals, etc." Moreover, nothing in either Sections 61-1-
1(2) nor 61-1-21 purport to operate differendy when applied to control persons. 
In interpreting a statute, courts look first "to its plain language to determine its 
meaning." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 304,fil, 169 P.3d 778. Under the plain language 
of these provisions, Johnson is distinct from both Schwenke and American Dairy, even if 
Johnson is a purported "control person" of American Dairy. Tellingly, the State did not 
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charge American Dairy. By charging Johnson as an individual, the State needs to show that 
Johnson himself "willfully" omitted to state a material fact necessary to make a statement 
made by Johnson not misleading, in light of the circumstances under which Johnson made the 
statement. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2), 61-1-21. The key feature of Section 61-1-1 is it 
does not require any person to say anything initially. It only criminalizes a statement already 
made, a so-called "predicate statement," that is materially misleading because of an omission. 
That there is no criminal "control person" liability is further apparent when Sections 
61-1-1 and 61-1-21 are read in conjunction with Section 61-1-22. Section 61-1-22 provides 
civil remedies for violation of the Act See Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-22(l)(a). Subsection 61-
l-22(4)(a) provides for civil "control person" liability: 
(4) (a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable 
under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or 
buyer, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, 
every employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the sale or 
purchase . . . are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as 
the seller or purchaser . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4)(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
Utah Courts "read the plain language of a statute as a whole, with due consideration 
of the other provisions and in an effort to interpret them in harmony with each other and 
with other statutes under the same and related chapters." State v, Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ^|8, 
63 P.3d 667 (quotations and citation omitted). Reading Sections 61-1-1, 61-1-13, 61-1-21, 
and 61-1-22 together, it is clear that "control persons" do not have greater criminal liability 
than any other individual or entity. Section 61-1-22 shows an intent by the legislature in 
certain civil cases to make "control persons" vicariously liable for the acts of others, 
including corporations. That there is no corresponding "control person" language in Section 
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61-1-21 is a clear indication of legislative intent to limit this secondary "control person" 
liability to the civil arena. Johnson cannot be held criminally liable under Section 61-1-21 for 
statements made by or acts of Schwenke or American Dairy, or for pure omissions, simply 
by virtue of his purported position as president or officer of American Dairy. 
B. The State's argument that Johnson has greater criminal liability through 
enhanced disclosure requirements as a control person is contrary to the 
plain language of Utah's act. 
Contrary to this plain language of Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21, the State insists there 
is criminal "control person" liability in the form of heightened disclosure obligations upon 
these "control persons." For example, the State identifies hypothetical statements and 
disclosures Johnson purportedly should have made to Myers and Young as a so-called 
"control person" of American Dairy, such as: 
Before Young and Myers signed the documents, neither defendant nor 
Schwenke presented any additional "historical business information" about 
Americandairy.com or information about the "current or past financial 
situation" of the corporation (R. 1999:225; 230). Nor did they provide a 
complete list of the principals in the corporation, or any information 
concerning the principals' financial background and history (R. 1999:155,225). 
In addition, although defendant and Schwenke told Young and Myers there 
were "risks in any stock transaction," they never enumerated those risks (R. 
1999:145-46, 230). Nor did they offer any additional information concerning 
either the $10 million Schwenke supposedly could contribute to the enterprise 
or the "possible market for the stock" . . . [or] that, during the period in which 
this transaction was presented and then executed . . . [Johnson] had three 
federal tax liens against his property for over $1,645,500.00 and had a Small 
Business Administration judgment against him. 
(Appellee's Br., pp.7-8.) 
During trial, Mr. Hines made similar declarations to the jury, over Johnson's 
objections, opining that Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 imposed a duty upon Johnson to 
disclose certain "important facts . . . in all circumstances," including 
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[the] financial statements of the entity which would include audited balance 
sheets, that would include the history of any of the control peoplef,] whether 
they have been civilly sued, whether they've had administrative actions, 
bankruptcies and things likeQ that Competition in the market, conflict of 
interest Necessary disclosure would include risk factors and there's . . . It's a 
very broad range. 
(R. 1999:55-56; see also Johnson's Opening Br., pp. 29-33.) Thus, the State believes, and 
improperly informed the jury over Johnson's objections, that control persons, as opposed to 
other persons, can violate Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 through pure omissions. 
The State's only support for its interpretation is not the language of Sections 61-1-1 
or 61-1-21, or even any Utah law, but rather two federal cases interpreting federal law— 
Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Merchant Capital, LLC, 483 R3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2007) and 
Sue^ Equity Investors, LP. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 R3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2001). (Appellee's 
Br., pp. 36-38.) The State's reliance on these authorities is completely misplaced. 
First and foremost, the cases interpret federal law, not Utah law. In Merchant Capitial, 
the SEC alleged that "the defendants violated [Sjection 10(b) of the Exchange Act and 
section 17(a) of the Securities Act" 483 F.3d at 766. These statutes have markedly different 
elements than Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21, requiring, among other things, statements made 
"with negligence," in the case of Section 17(a)(2)-(3), or with "scienter" for 10(b). Id. 
Similarly, Sue% involved a private civil action under Section 10(b), Rule 10(b)(5), and for 
control person liability under 15 U.S.C. § 78t. See 250 F.3d at 94. The Utah Supreme Court 
has specifically distinguished between Utah and federal securities laws, concluding federal 
securities precedent was distinguishable from, and not controlling over, Utah law. State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1358-60 (Utah 1993). 
Second, both of federal cases involve civil actions, rather than criminal. The burden 
6 
of proof in Sue^and Merchant Capital was thus not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt/' as it 
is here. Sue% furthermore, involved an appeal from a grant of a morion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6). See 250 F.3d at 95. The Second Circuit was merely asked to review the 
adequacy of the allegations while "accepting all allegations in the complaint as true"; it did 
not, as the State claims, examine the merits of the allegations. Id. at 95-96. 
Third, Sue% and Merchant Capital'are factually distinct. Contrary to the defendants in 
these cases, it is undisputed that Johnson received no direct or indirect economic benefit, 
including shares of American Dairy, from any party at any time. It remains undisputed that 
no party intended or believed Johnson would be involved in the company going forward. 
(R. 1999:181, 186-87, 313, 329). The State further acknowledges that Young and Myers did 
not rely on Johnson's representations and would have done the deal even if Johnson were 
not involved. (Appellee's Br., p. 8; see also R. 1999:154,179.) Indeed, given Myers' and 
Young's lack of reliance on any statement of Johnson, they could not even maintain a civil 
action against Johnson under the federal authorities cited by the State. Under Rule 10b-5, 
for example, a plaintiff must show he or she relied on the defendant's omission of material 
information and that this omission caused his or her damages. See Sue^} 250 F.3d at 95. 
Thus, even if this Court were to accept the State's invitation to carry federal civil law 
standards into state criminal law, the charges against Johnson would require dismissal. 
Fourth, other federal authorities cited in Johnson's opening brief (pp. 35-36), and 
ignored by the State, refused to hold pure omissions actionable, regardless of the speaker. See 
e.g., Otis & Co. v. S.E.C, 106 F.2d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 1939) (observing "[Section 17(a)(2)] did 
not require appellant to state every fact about stock offered that a prospective purchaser 
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might like to know or that might, if known, tend to influence his decision, but it did require 
appellant not 'to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material 
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading/"); Howing v. 
Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1481 (6th Cir. 1987) (observing Rule 10b-5 "prohibits] 
silence only where the omitted information is necessary to prevent inaccuracy in existing 
disclosure," and thus refusing to hold Rule 10b-5 requires disclosure of all required 
information fro registration statements under Rule 13e-3 because "[tjhis is tantamount to 
incorporating the disclosure provisions of the securities laws into the antifraud provisions."). 
In short, the State's theory of enhanced criminal liability for control persons is not 
supported by Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21. These statutes apply equally to "any person," 
including an individual or a corporation, who, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase 
of any security willfully omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made by that person, in light of the circumstances under which the statements 
are made, not misleading. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. A person's status as a 
control person cannot alter the language of these statutes. Johnson had no obligation under 
the statutes to disclose historical business information or his personal and wholly unrelated 
financial information simply because he was a "control person," unless he first uttered a 
qualifying predicate statement. The State has identified no such predicate statement. 
The State's alternative contention that the phrase in Section 61-1-1(2), "in light of the 
circumstances under which they are made," provides for enhanced disclosures from "control 
persons" is an unjustified stretch. The pronoun "they" in this phrase refers to the 
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"statements," i.e., the predicate statements, not to the person making the statements. The 
phrase itself modifies the term "misleading"—i.e., whether a particular predicate statement is 
misleading given the circumstances under which it is made. This phrase does not alter the 
basic operation of the statute by requiring the person at issue to affirmatively make certain 
predicate statements simply because of that person's status with the company. Under the 
statute, the "circumstances" already exist when the statement is made, the circumstances do 
not create an obligation to make a statement in the first place. 
II. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT SECTIONS 61-1-1 AND 61-1-21 
OPERATE AS PURE OMISSION STATUTES FOR CONTROL PERSONS 
VIOLATES THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In addition to being contrary to the language of the Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21, 
the State's interpretation of the Act violates the Utah Constitution. As indicated in 
Johnson's opening brief, (pp. 42-45), the State violated Johnson's due process rights by 
contending Johnson could be convicted for failing to affirmatively disclose a sweeping and 
undefined list of all facts. This interpretation removed required elements from the statutes 
resulting in an unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary application. The State also violated the 
Separation of Powers clause of the Utah Constitution by altering the language and operation 
of the statute during trial, through Mr. Hines testimony and the prosecutor's statements. 
The State argues, however, that Johnson's constitutional rights were not violated 
because (1) it did not misrepresent the law and (2) even if it did, Johnson was not prejudiced 
because the trial court cured the misrepresentations through end-of-trial jury instructions. 
Both of these contentions are without merit. The sole case the State cites in support of its 
argument, State v, Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) does not even address either 
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of Johnson's constitutional arguments. The issues in luongshaw were prosecutorial 
misconduct and insufficiency of evidence. Id. at 927. It should be disregarded out of hand. 
1. The State violated Johnson's due process rights. 
Section 61-1-1(2) avoids being overly vague on its face and otherwise satisfies due 
process by requiring the defendant to first make a predicate statement, and then provide all 
facts necessary to make that predicate statement not misleading in light of the circumstances 
under which it is made. Section 61-1-21 also guards against vagueness by requiring a 
"willfulj]" violation of Section 61-1-1. As written, these statutes give the defendant the 
requisite notice of the prohibited conduct so he can govern himself accordingly. 
The State did not apply these statutes to Johnson as written, however. Instead, both 
the prosecutor and Mr. Hines told the jury that Section 61-1-1—a confusingly worded 
statute at best—required Johnson to disclose an undefined and limitless amount of 
information; basically, any additional information about the transaction or Johnson's 
unrelated personal history the jury might like to know. {See, e.g., R. 1999:55—"The 
important facts that would have to be disclosed in all circumstances are numerous." 
(emphasis added).) Indeed, the very manner in which Mr. Hines described the purported list 
of required information to the jury—"It's a very broad range"—is vague. (R. 1999:56.) 
At that point, the State had not just made an innocuous misstatement of the law, it 
had arbitrarily prosecuted Johnson for failing to make disclosures he had no notice or actual 
obligation to make. This violated Johnson's due process rights in two ways. First, it 
eliminated the State's burden to prove each element of Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Namely, the State avoided the statutory obligation to prove the existence 
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of a predicate statement that was made misleading by Johnson's willful omission of material 
facts. See State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24,^13, 980 P.2d 191 (holding "due process requires that 
the prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
Second, the State prosecuted Johnson under an unconstitutionally vague application 
of the statutes. Because it is not required by the statute, Johnson could have no notice of a 
purported obligation to disclose an undefined "broad range" of information, making his 
conviction for failing to do so unconstitutional. See West Valley City v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613, 
615 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void 
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.") This is particularly true here 
because the jury was instructed that Myers5 and Young's lack of reliance on Johnson was 
irrelevant, so long as the members of jury might have relied on the information if they stood 
in Myers' and Young's shoes. (R. 1448.) How does one determine when one has disclosed 
everything a hypothetical person, in hindsight, might want to know? Such a standard gives 
the State unfettered and arbitrary discretion to designate anything unsaid as a violation. This 
is unconstitutional. See Streeter, 849 P.2d at 615 ("A vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application . . . ."). 
The State's assertion that only "control persons" have a heightened affirmative 
disclosure obligation does not circumvent this constitutional violation. That argument 
suffers from the same basic malady. Namely, it is not provided for by the statutes at issue. 
The State's constitutional violations occurred the moment Mr. Hines' incorrect 
testimony was given. If such violations could be cured through a jury instruction, and the 
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State has cited no law suggesting they can, the curative instruction must at least come at the 
time the violations occur. Rather than make timely curative instructions, however, the trial 
court overruled Johnson's objections and invited Johnson to cross-examine Mr. Hines about 
his opinions on the law. (See, e.g., R. 1999:55-57.) The "curative instructions" the State 
primarily relies on were instructions given by the trial court at the very beginning and the 
very end of trial. (See Appellee's Br., p. 42.) See, e.g., U.S. ex. rel Burke v. Greer, 756 F.2d 
1295, 1303 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Such final jury instructions are 'ordinarily not sufficient,' 
however, to cure constitutional errors." (citation omitted)). 
Although the State does reference one instruction occurring during Mr. Hines' 
testimony, a single instruction should not be sufficient to ameliorate an entire day of 
constitutionally impermissible testimony and statements. (SeeR. 1999:17-18, 51-52, 55-57, 
59-61, 62,101,104-05,109, 485-86, 527-28, 529-32.) Moreover, the referenced instruction 
itself is deficient. The trial court did not attempt to inform the jury what the actual law is or 
otherwise correct Mr. Hines' misstatements. Rather, the instruction came in this context: 
Mr. Johnson: Objection and ask that be stricken. I think that also goes to the 
jury instruction we, we discussed. 
The Judge: Well the court is going, the court is going to indicate to the jury 
that at some point in this trial the court is going to give you instructions with 
respect to a, issues of law that you, that will govern your deliberations. And a, 
at that time a, the court will instruct you as to what the law is. 
Go ahead Mr. Baer [Prosecutor]. 
Q [Prosecutor]. Are there any other important significant factors that a, come 
into your purview, that come into your consideration when you're taking a 
look at a. circumstances of an individual or entities that are making 
these sort of transactions, exchanges? 
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A. [Mr. Hines]. I don't think its possible to specifically list all the 
circumstances that would need to be disclosed. Again, the test is does a 
reasonable prudent investor, is that a fact that they would want to know. 
That's as narrow as I can make it. 
(R. 1999:61-62 (emphasis added).) 
Thus, the trial court informed the jury that at some point it would be telling it the 
law, but did not correct any misstatement of the law. Indeed, direcdy after the trial court's 
admonition, Mr. Hines again misinformed the jury that the law, according the Department 
of Enforcement, required Johnson to disclose all facts a reasonable investor "would want to 
know." (Id,) There was no correction of this error. If the trial court's limited instructions 
were sufficient to cure all of Mr. Hines' constitutionally impermissible testimony, then it was 
error to allow Mr. Hines' legal-conclusion-laden testimony in the first place. It would not be 
helpful to the jury, making it an improper use of expert testimony. See U.R.E. 702 (requiring 
expert testimony be "helpful"); accord State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909, 914 (Utah Ct App. 1997). 
2. Violation of the Separation of Powers clause. 
The State further transgressed the constitutional requirement of Separation of Powers 
by presenting a member of the executive branch, the Director for Enforcement for the Utah 
Division of Securities, as its expert witness and having him, in effect, legislate from the 
witness stand by offering an incorrect interpretation of the law. The State does not address 
this argument with any meaningful analysis, relying exclusively, and incorrectiy, on hongshaw 
to claim that Johnson was not prejudiced and therefore there was no constitutional violation. 
The State's argument is not logical. Although Johnson was prejudiced, this is an 
entirely different question than whether the State violated the constitution in the first place. 
Mr. Hines, and the State through Mr. Hines, assumed the role of the legislature when he 
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testified as to the requirements of Utah's securities laws, and altered the language of the 
statutes to lessen the State's burden by transforming Section 61-1-1(2) into a pure omission 
statute for control persons. This is not the same as a police offer testifying as an expert 
regarding drug terminology, or even Mr. Hines testifying as to the mechanics of an IPO. 
Rather, when Mr. Hines testifies that the law says something it does not, Mr. Hines and the 
State stray into the role of the legislature, which is proscribed by the Utah Constitution. See 
Utah Const, art. V, sec. 1; art. VI, sec. 1. The State may wish the statute was different, but 
the State is not the legislature and not permitted to make law or punish individuals for 
"constructive offenses." McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). 
The trial court failed to correct this constitutional violation with any timely curative 
instruction, as indicated above, prejudicing Johnson as the jury likely relied on impermissible 
grounds, i.e., Johnson's failure to disclose all material facts, in convicting Johnson. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING MR. 
HINES' INCORRECT LEGAL-CONCLUSION-LADEN TESTIMONY, 
Even assuming Mr. Hines' improper testimony does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation, the trial court still abused its discretion by allowing Mr. Hines' 
incorrect legal-conclusion-based testimony for the reasons discussed in Johnson's opening 
brief. The State argues that Mr. Hines' testimony was proper because (1) expert testimony 
couched in legal conclusions is permissible in securities cases because of the technical nature 
of securities; (2) Mr. Hines testimony provided correct interpretations of the law; and (3) 
defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony, in any event. 
The State's first contention mischaracterizes the issue. Johnson acknowledges that 
expert testimony may be permissible in securities cases because of the technical nature of 
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securities. Here, however, the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Mr. Hines to go 
beyond describing the technical operations of securities, and to instead opine at length on 
the Utah Division of Securities' interpretation of Utah's securities laws. Rather than control 
the proceedings or diligendy remind the jury that it was the court's role to provide the law, 
the trial court overruled Johnson's objections by telling Johnson he could cross-examine Mr. 
Hines. [See, e.g., R. 1999:51-52.) Because he had no other choice, Johnson accepted this 
obligation and presented his own expert witness, Nathan Drage, who was also questioned at 
length about the effect and language of Utah's securities laws. (R. 1999:62-105, 439-65.) As 
a result, Johnson's trial improperly devolved into an argument over the requirements of 
Utah's securities laws. Presented with such divergent interpretations of what the law 
requires, the jury could not help but be confused by what they heard, particularly given the 
trial court's lack of guidance. This is not helpful to the trier of fact and should not have 
been allowed. See U.R.E. 702 (requiring expert testimony be helpful). 
Although the State argues that Mr. Hines did, on occasion, provide the correct 
statement of the law to the jury, this argument only belabors the point. The trial court 
should not have allowed Mr. Hines to vacillate between correct and incorrect interpretations 
of the law; it is confusing. It puts the jury in the untenable position of determing which is 
the correct interpretation. And, as indicated above, if Mr. Hines' improper and incorrect 
legal testimony could be corrected with final jury instructions with the correct law, then there 
was little point to allowing his testimony in the first place, making it improper as not helpful. 
Next, as discussed above, there is also no merit to the State's second argument that 
Mr. Hines' testimony regarding disclosures required of "control persons" was a correct 
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interpretation of the law. 
Finally, as indicated in Johnson's opening brief, he was severely prejudiced by the 
erroneous and insufficiendy cured interpretations of Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. Once 
Johnson's conduct is considered in light of the correct interpretation of these statutes, it is 
clear he did not violate the law. One of the few possible predicate statements identified by 
the State is that Schwenke introduced Johnson as a "high-powered lawyer" and a "securities 
expert." (Appellees' Br., p. 6.) Even assuming Johnson is accountable for Schwenke's 
statements, which he is not, there is nothing misleading about a description of Johnson as a 
"securities expert." Johnson has Wall Street experience. More importandy, the State never 
indicated what additional material facts would make this statement not misleading. 
Regarding Johnson's status as a high powered lawyer, the State asserts this was 
misleading because Johnson 
never told Myers and Young that, during the period in which this transaction 
was presented and then executed, he "was subject to disciplinary proceedings 
before the Utah State Bar alleging misappropriation of client funds from an 
event which occurred in October of 1992, [but which had not been finalized 
as of August 9, 2000 and that Defendant Johnson was in August of 2000 a 
lawyer in good standing licensed to practice law in the State of Utah."] 
(Appellee's Br., p. 8, quotingK. 1425.) Notably, the State's brief truncates the stipulated 
disclosure so as to remove the bracketed portion. When the full stipulation is considered, 
the statement Johnson is "a high-powered lawyer" is not misleading. Johnson was a lawyer 
at all relevant times. Further, neither Young, Myers nor Schwenke regarded Johnson as their 
attorney nor American Dairy's attorney. (R.1999:182-83,186-87, 220-221, 303.) 
The State also credits Johnson with vaguely describing to Young how stocks work, 
describing to Myers how the general process of taking a company public works and musing, 
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with Schwenke, about possible prices for the American Dairy stock if there were to be an 
initial public offer ("IPO") at some point in the future. (See Appellee's Br., pp. 5-6.) The 
State does not even assert that Johnson's explanation was tied to American Dairy or to any 
purported offer or sale of American Dairy's stock.1 
Indeed, all other circumstances and statements indicate it was not. Myers asked 
Johnson whether "he could be involved in that public offering," if and when it took place. 
(Id.) Johnson said "it would be highly unusual but it could happen." (Id.) Myers and Young 
then had their own attorney review and amend the Agreement to add language to undo the 
transaction if American Dairy did not go public within two years. (Id.; see also Agreement, p. 
7,1[6(c).) Although Myers asserted that both Schwenke and Johnson identified possible 
IPO prices for American Dairy stock, (R. 1999:218), the alleged "offer or sale" at issue was 
clearly not an IPO and no party involved in that transaction believed otherwise. In fact, 
Young testified that Johnson made no representations about being involved in any future 
IPO. (R. 1999:166.) Even assuming Johnson (rather than Schwenke) made these 
statements, it is difficult to determine which omissions rendered them materially misleading, 
let alone how they are even relevant to the August 9, 2000 "offer or sale" at issue. 
Accordingly, because there are no identified misleading statements that could support 
Johnson's conviction, the jury must have relied upon, or was at least irreparably confused by, 
the State's and Mr. Hines' misstatements of law in convicting Johnson. Johnson was thus 
gready prejudiced by the errors, requiring reversal. 
1
 Cf Warner Comm. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482,1491 (D.C. Del. 1984) ("It is well 
established that the federal securities laws do not impose a duty to disclose information 
regarding current or future plans that are uncertain and contingent in nature."). 
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IV. THE SECURITIES FRAUD STATUTE IS N O T APPLICABLE TO 
JOHNSON BECAUSE THERE WAS N O "OFFER" OR "SALE" OF A 
SECURITY BY JOHNSON FOR VALUE. 
As indicated in Johnson's opening brief, Section 61-1-1 is not applicable to Johnson 
in this case because there was no "offer" or "sale" of a security by Johnson "for value." See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 (requiring an "offer" or "sale" to trigger the statute); 61-1-13(22) 
(2000) (defining an sale or offer to be a "disposition" or "at tempt. . . to dispose" of a 
security "for value"). It is undisputed that Johnson received no direct financial benefit from 
the transaction at issue. He received no money or property from Myers, Young, Schwenke, 
or any other person or entity involved in this transaction. It is further indisputable that 
Johnson received no indirect financial benefit from this deal. He neither owned nor received 
any shares in American Dairy. The August 9, 2000 transaction served, at best, to transfer 
Myer's and Young's ownership of Milk-King, LLC's (the "LLC") property from the LLC to 
American Dairy, of which Myers and Young were the only shareholders. That they would 
remain the only shareholders was, in fact, guaranteed by Paragraph 3(b)(1) of the Agreement. 
Evidence adduced at the restitution hearing further establishes that Myers and Young 
actually held title to the "transferred" equipment personally and disposed of the property 
without regard to a purported ownership interest by American Dairy. (See R. 1999: 172, 
184,2075:115-29, 200-02 ; R. 2075(2d): 6-7,14-19, 30-39, 47-49; Restitution Exhibits 3-6, 9-
10,12,18-19; See also Johnson's Opening Brief, Fact Nos. 33, 42, and pp. 47-51.) Moreover, 
this evidence proves the property allegedly transferred by Myers and Young did not have the 
values testified to at trial, but was so encumbered as to be valueless. (Id.) This independently 
establishes that Myers' and Young's purported disposition of property was not "for value," 
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to trigger Section 61-1-1 liability, and certainly did not amount to a transfer of $10,000 or 
more "worth" of property to trigger second degree felony liability under Section 61-1-21 (2).2 
Notwithstanding these undisputed facts, the State makes four arguments as to why 
Johnson made an offer or sale of American Dairy stock to Myers and Young under 61-1-1. 
First, the State argues "nothing in defendant's or Schwenke's description of their proposal 
suggested the victims' transfer of their farm from their LLC to Americandairy.com would 
merely effect a change in the form of their ownership of the farm." (Appellee's Br., p. 13.) 
This argument misses the mark. The State does not identify a single "proposal" made 
by Johnson; all of the statements identified by the State in support of this argument were 
made by Schwenke. (Id.) Johnson was not charged with conspiracy to violate Section 61-1-1, 
and cannot be held criminally liable for Schwenke's or American Dairy's acts. By charging 
Johnson as an individual, the State must show Johnson made the alleged offer or sale. 
More importandy, Schwenke's preliminary description of his plan is not an "offer" or 
"sale" to "dispose o f securities of American Dairy under the statute. Utah Code Ann. §61-
l-13(22)(b). The State ignores the actual facts of August 9, 2000 transaction at issue. Just 
because Myers and Young were not specifically told "this transaction will merely effect a 
change in the form of [your] ownership" of LLC property, does not change the fact that this 
is exacdy what the transaction did. The economic reality of the deal, not the use of magic 
words, is determinative. Indeed, Myers and Young were promised in the Agreement that it 
would merely change their form of ownership, insomuch as they were guaranteed to be the 
2
 This was the basis, in part, for Johnson's Motion for a New Trial and Renewed 
Motion for a New Trial, which the trial court erred in denying. These grounds are discussed 
in detail in Johnson's Opening Brief, pp. 46-51. That Johnson properly perfected his appeal 
of this issue is established in Section V, below. 
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only shareholders of American Dairy. (Agreement, 1|3(b)(i).) While the State argues Johnson 
should not be given credit because Myers and Young were just the first shareholders, the 
fact remains that Myers and Young were always the only shareholders. This is guaranteed by 
the Agreement. For any other persons to become shareholders, the Agreement would have 
to be amended, with Myers' and Young's permission, and a new transaction completed. 
Johnson cannot be held criminally liable for a hypothetical transaction that never occurred. 
The State's second argument, that the Agreement itself constitutes an offer or sale of 
a security, is meritless for similar reasons. The recitations in the Agreement regarding a 
"purchase and sale7' of American Dairy's stock do not change the fact that Myers and Young 
were the only ones on both sides of the transaction. Myers and Young were the buyers and 
the sellers, not Johnson, who received absolutely no economic benefit from the transaction. 
Third, the State disputes Johnson's citation to Premier Van Schaack Realty, Inc. v. Sieg, 
2002 UT App 173, 51 P.3d 24, and argues that Capital General Corp. v. Utah Department of 
Business Regulation, 111 P.2d 494, 497 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) supports its case rather than 
Johnson's. The State's attempt to force the present case into the facts of Capital Generally 
misplaced. In Capital General the Utah Securities Division filed an administration action 
against Capital General Corporation (the "Corporation") alleging unlawful distribution of 
shares without registration. Id. at 495. The Corporation had purchased 1,000,000 shares of 
another company ("Company") for $2,000, making it the sole shareholder of the Company. 
Id. The Corporation then distributed these shares to 900 of its clients for free. Id. This 
Court held that this distribution was "for value" to trigger liability under Section 61-1-7 of 
the Utah Securities Act because it created a market for the shares that did not exist before, 
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some of which shares were still owned by the Corporation. Id. at 497-98. 
Unlike the defendant in Capital General, Johnson owned no shares of American Dairy 
and thus received no direct or indirect financial benefit from the transaction at issue. 
Contrary to the State's insistence, Johnson is not the same "person" as American Dairy 
under the Act, as described above, even if he is a so-called "control person." Notably, no 
"control persons" of the Corporation are implicated in Capital General. Under the Capital 
General fact pattern, it is Myers and Young, the sole shareholders, who stand in the shoes of 
the Corporation. If Myers and Young were to give away some of their shares of American 
Dairy, they might benefit from the creation of a market. Johnson, however, would not, 
particularly because no party believed he was going to be involved in American Dairy going 
forward. (R. 1999:182-83, 186-87, 317, 352; R 2075(2d): 7, 27.) 
This Court's decision in Sieg, on the other hand, supports Johnson's position, 
although it is not a securities case. In Sieg, this Court held that there was no consideration, 
and thus no sale or exchange, because the seller retained an interest in property he 
transferred to a joint venture in exchange for an interest in the joint venture. Id, at ^12-16. 
The purported sale involved a mere "change in the form of ownership" of the property. Id. 
at 1HJ12 (quotations and citation omitted). Similarly, Myers and Young retained the same 
interest in the property both before and after the transaction at issue. The only difference is 
they held it through American Dairy rather than through the LLC. 
Finally, the State argues that the transaction at issue was an automatic offer or sale 
under Section 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii) (2000), which provides: 
The issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation, reorganization, 
recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition of assets shall constitute the 
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offer or sale of the security issued as well as the offer to buy or the purchase 
of any security surrendered in connection therewith . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). The State does not indicate how this provision is applicable. In fact, it 
is not. The transaction at issue was not a merger or consolidation because the LLC was not 
merged into, consolidated with, or otherwise absorbed by American Dairy. 19 Am. Jur. 2d 
Corporations § 2168 (2008) ("A merger is often defined as the absorption of one 
corporation by another . . . ."). The LLC's existence continued after the August 9, 2000 
transaction. There are also no facts to suggest the August 9, 2000 transaction involved the 
"issuance of a security under a . . . reorganization, recapitalization, [or] reclassification of" 
American Dairy or the LLC. Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(22)(c)(vii). Moreover, Myers and 
Young did not surrender their LLC membership interests to Johnson or anybody else. In 
fact, because there were less than five members of the LLC, the LLC's interests are not even 
considered securities under the Act. See id. § 61-1-13(24)(b)(ii). 
Although it is difficult to tell from the State's analysis, it presumably relies on the 
"acquisition of assets" language of this provision. This too is inapplicable. Because Johnson 
is not the same "person" as American Dairy under the Act, and because Johnson owns no 
shares of American Dairy, he did not direcdy or indirectiy acquire any assets in the August 9, 
2000 transaction. Myers and Young, the sole shareholders of American Dairy following the 
alleged asset acquisition, merely altered their form of ownership of these assets from LLC to 
American Dairy. This conclusion is further buttressed by the facts that (a) Myers and Young 
continued to control all aspects of the dairy operations and receive all proceeds therefrom in 
the same manner as they did prior to converting from the LLC to American Dairy; (b) title 
to the farm equipment supposedly acquired by American Dairy was never actually owned by 
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the LLC and was never actually transferred to American Dairy, but was held personally by 
Myers and Young, who later disposed of that property without regard to American Dairy; 
and (c) the Agreement allowed Myers and Young to undo the transaction if in two years 
American Dairy did not go public. (Johnson's Opening Br., Fact Nos. 33, 42, and pp. 47-51; 
Agreement ^|6(c).) Thus, there was no actual acquisition of these assets by American Dairy 
or disposition of these assets by Myers and Young in the August 9, 2000 transaction. 
Moreover, in asserting this provision applies, the State once again ignores the 
language of the statute, which requires the "issuance of a security under a[n] . . . . 
acquisition of assets." There were no securities "issued" to effect an asset acquisition. 
American Dairy shares were already issued as of August 9, 2000. (Agreement, recitals, p. 1.) 
In sum, there was no offer or sale of a security by Johnson to trigger securities 
liability because Johnson derived no value from the August 9, 2000 transaction. Myers and 
Young, at best, merely altered their form of ownership of some of the LLC's assets, without 
affecting their actual ownership interests in these assets. 
V. JOHNSON PERFECTED HIS APPEAL FROM T H E ORDERS DENYING 
HIM A NEW TRIAL AND FROM THE RESTITUTION ORDER BY 
TIMELY FILING AN AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
The State does not meaningfully address the merits of Johnson's appeal from the trial 
court's Orders on Johnson's Motion for a New Trial, Renewed Motion for a New Trial, and 
Restitution. Rather, the State seeks to preclude this Court's review of these Orders on a 
technicality, arguing Johnson did not "perfect" his right to appeal these Orders. The State's 
argument is meritless. Johnson perfected his rights to appeal all of the trial court's Orders in 
this case through his timely Notice of Appeal, filed November 8, 2007, and his Amended 
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Notice of Appeal, filed August 19, 2008, within 30 days of the trial court's entry of the final 
Order in this case. (Amended Notice of Appeal, attached as Addendum A to this Reply.) 
Johnson's Notice of Appeal was filed on November 8, 2007, within 30 days after the 
Order Denying Johnson's Motion for a New Trial was entered on October 10, 2007. The 
State's argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider errors in that Order is patently 
groundless. Because Johnson's Motion for a New Trial was a post judgment motion under 
Rule 4(b), it tolled the time for appeal from all issues preceding this. See Utah R. App. P. 
4(b). The State has thus waived its right to address these issues. This Court should reverse 
on the grounds stated in Johnson's opening Brief, pp. 46-51. 
The State's perfection argument regarding the Restitution Order and Order Denying 
Johnson's Renewed Motion are similarly groundless. The State fails to acknowledge that 
Johnson timely filed an Amended Notice of Appeal wherein he specifically indicated an 
intent to appeal from these Orders. Johnson, through counsel, filed the Amended Notice in 
the Court of Appeals, as reflected on the Amended Notice and the Appellate Docket, and as 
instructed by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Lisa Collins.3 (See August 19, 2008 Letter to 
Lisa Collins, attached as Addendum B to this Reply.) Johnson served a copy of the 
Amended Notice upon the Utah Attorney General's Office, giving it notice of his intent to 
appeal these issues, and satisfying the purpose of a notice of appeal. See Nunley v. Stan Kat% 
Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (1964) (observing "the object of a notice 
3
 This was an unusual situation because the record was already in the Court of Appeals 
and a briefing schedule had been issued when Johnson's counsel discovered the State had 
failed to prepare a final Order on Johnson's Renewed Motion as instructed by the trial court 
Johnson thus filed the Amended Notice in the Court of Appeals as instructed. Johnson 
further notes that Rule 4 does not require amended notices be filed in the trial court. 
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of appeal is to advise the opposite party that an appeal has been taken . . . ."). 
Moreover, even if the Amended Notice were somehow insufficient, this does not 
affect Johnson's right to appeal the errors in the Restitution Order. The State curiously 
argues, based on an incorrect interpretation of State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, 106 P,3d 729, that 
"where a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case is entered before final determination 
of restitution, a timely notice of appeal from the underlying judgment does not necessarily 
constitute a timely notice of appeal from the order determining restitution." (Appellee's Br., 
p. 50.) In actuality, Garner flatly rejects the State's argument, holding: 
where orders for restitution remain open to be decided at a later date, the 
subsequent entry of the amount of restitution is not a new and final judgment 
for purposes of appealing the underlying merits of a criminal conviction. 
Entering a restitution amount is more like a clarification of a judgment than a 
material modification because the inclusion does not "chang[e] the substance 
or character of the judgment." 
Id. at ^ {17 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Because Johnson's Notice of Appeal of 
the underlying conviction was timely, he preserved his right to appeal the Restitution Order. 
Johnson thus properly perfected his right to appeal all of the issues raised herein 
through his timely Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. The Notice and 
Amended Notice bookend all issues in this case, satisfying Rule 4. Accordingly, the State's 
technicality based arguments are groundless. This Court should reverse the aforementioned 
Orders on the grounds stated in Johnson's original brief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those stated in Johnson's opening brief, Johnson's 
conviction must be vacated or at least reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of May 2009 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
lney G. Snow 
Walter A. Romney, Jr. 
Aaron D. Lebenta 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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Defendant Jamis M. Johnson, by and through his counsel, hereby provides this Amended 
Notice to the Utah Court of Appeals of his intent to take an appeal from the entire judgment of 
the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Fourth District Court, including the following; 
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a New Trial, Defendant indicated his intent to appeal issues arising from these Orders in his 
Docketing Statement, filed December 13,2007. 
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